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## Code Administrator Consultation Response Proforma

### CMP470: Introducing an Oversubscribed Technologies Commitment Fee

Industry parties are invited to respond to this consultation expressing their views and supplying the rationale for those views, particularly in respect of any specific questions detailed below.

Please send your responses to [cusc.team@neso.energy](mailto:cusc.team@neso.energy) by **5pm** on **30 June 2026**. Please note that any responses received after the deadline or sent to a different email address may not receive due consideration.

If you have any queries on the content of this consultation, please contact [cusc.team@neso.energy](mailto:cusc.team@neso.energy)

Respondent details	Please enter your details	
<b>Respondent name:</b>	Jonathan Thompson	
<b>Company name:</b>	Green Nation	
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<b>Phone number:</b>	01761 239104	
<b>Which best describes your organisation?</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Consumer body <input type="checkbox"/> Demand <input type="checkbox"/> Distribution Network Operator <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Generator <input type="checkbox"/> Industry body	<input type="checkbox"/> Storage <input type="checkbox"/> Supplier <input type="checkbox"/> System Operator <input type="checkbox"/> Transmission Owner <input type="checkbox"/> Virtual Lead Party <input type="checkbox"/> Other

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	<input type="checkbox"/> Interconnector	
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**I wish my response to be:**

(Please mark the relevant box)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Non-Confidential</b> ( <i>this will be shared with industry and the Panel for further consideration</i> )
	<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Confidential</b> ( <i>this will be disclosed to the Authority in full but, unless specified, will not be shared with the Panel or the industry for further consideration</i> )

**For reference the Applicable CUSC (non-charging) Objectives are:**

- i. *The efficient discharge by the Licensee of the obligations imposed on it by the Act and by this licence\*;*
- ii. *Facilitating effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity, and (so far as consistent therewith) facilitating such competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity;*
- iii. *Compliance with the Electricity Regulation and any relevant legally binding decision of the European Commission and/or the Agency \*\*; and*
- iv. *Promoting efficiency in the implementation and administration of the CUSC arrangements.*

\* See Electricity System Operator Licence

\*\*The Electricity Regulation referred to in objective (iii) is Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the

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*internal market for electricity (recast) as it has effect immediately before IP completion day as read with the modifications set out in the SI 2020/1006.*

**For reference, (for consultation question 5) the Electricity Balancing Regulation (EBR) Article 3 Objectives and regulatory aspects are:**

- a) fostering effective competition, non-discrimination and transparency in balancing markets;*
- b) enhancing efficiency of balancing as well as efficiency of national balancing markets;*
- c) integrating balancing markets and promoting the possibilities for exchanges of balancing services while contributing to operational security;*
- d) contributing to the efficient long-term operation and development of the electricity transmission system and electricity sector while facilitating the efficient and consistent functioning of day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets;*
- e) ensuring that the procurement of balancing services is fair, objective, transparent and market-based, avoids undue barriers to entry for new entrants, fosters the liquidity of balancing markets while preventing undue market distortions;*
- f) facilitating the participation of demand response including aggregation facilities and energy storage while ensuring they compete with other balancing services at a level playing field and, where necessary, act independently when serving a single demand facility;*
- g) facilitating the participation of renewable energy sources and supporting the achievement of any target specified in an enactment for the share of energy from renewable sources.*

**What is the EBR?**

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The Electricity Balancing Regulation (EBR) is a European Network Code introduced by the Third Energy Package European legislation in late 2017.

The EBR regulation lays down the rules for the integration of balancing markets in Europe, with the objectives of enhancing Europe's security of supply. The EBR aims to do this through harmonisation of electricity balancing rules and facilitating the exchange of balancing resources between European Transmission System Operators (TSOs). Article 18 of the EBR states that TSOs such as the NESO should have terms and conditions developed for balancing services, which are submitted and approved by Ofgem.

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**Please express your views in the right-hand side of the table below, including your rationale.**

Standard Code Administrator Consultation questions		
1	Please provide your assessment for the proposed solutions against the Applicable Objectives against the current baseline.	Mark the Objectives which you believe the proposed solutions better facilitates than the current baseline:
		Original <input type="checkbox"/> i <input type="checkbox"/> ii <input type="checkbox"/> iii <input type="checkbox"/> iv <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> None
		WACM1 <input type="checkbox"/> i <input type="checkbox"/> ii <input type="checkbox"/> iii <input type="checkbox"/> iv <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> None
		WACM2 <input type="checkbox"/> i <input type="checkbox"/> ii <input type="checkbox"/> iii <input type="checkbox"/> iv <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> None
		WACM3 <input type="checkbox"/> i <input type="checkbox"/> ii <input type="checkbox"/> iii <input type="checkbox"/> iv <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> None
		WACM4 <input type="checkbox"/> i <input type="checkbox"/> ii <input type="checkbox"/> iii <input type="checkbox"/> iv <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> None
		WACM5 <input type="checkbox"/> i <input type="checkbox"/> ii <input type="checkbox"/> iii <input type="checkbox"/> iv <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> None
		WACM6 <input type="checkbox"/> i <input type="checkbox"/> ii <input type="checkbox"/> iii <input type="checkbox"/> iv <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> None
		This is a fundamentally flawed proposal which does not promote faster connections or more efficient use and upgrade of the network, but simply rewards those developers with sufficient spare capital to sit out the proposed process
2	Do you have a preferred proposed solution?	<input type="checkbox"/> Original <input type="checkbox"/> WACM1 <input type="checkbox"/> WACM2

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		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WACM3 <input type="checkbox"/> WACM4 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WACM5 <input type="checkbox"/> WACM6 <input type="checkbox"/> Baseline <input type="checkbox"/> No preference
		<p>WACM3 &amp; WACM5 appear to reduce the damage caused by the proposed mechanism, though as least bad solutions rather than something that would improve the functioning of the market</p>
3	Do you support the proposed implementation approach?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
		<p>Click or tap here to enter text.</p>
4	Do you have any other comments?	<p>As noted above, this proposal does not prioritise the most economically viable projects, simply those whose lead investors have the greatest amount of spare capital.</p> <p>To tie up large amounts of capital for many years while projects wait to be connected is unreasonable and inefficient.</p> <p>As only a small percentage of the queue will be connected within the next 12 months, there is time</p>

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		<p>to look for a solution that better meets Applicable Objectives (ii) and (iv). These could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Additional but proportionate charges where expensive upgrades to the network are required - to encourage attrition where that will improve efficiency</li> <li>• Queue Management Milestones</li> <li>• Incentives to projects to drop from Gate 2 to Gate 1 or to leave the queue altogether – all projects have incurred often substantial costs to obtain grid connection offers and planning consent. The less economic projects will have a real incentive to accept a refund of grid fees (and/or other costs)</li> </ul>
5	<p>Do you agree with the Workgroup's assessment that the modification <u>does not</u> impact the Electricity Balancing Regulation (EBR) Article 18 terms and conditions held within the Code?</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/>Yes</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/>No</p> <hr/> <p>Click or tap here to enter text.</p>